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Abstract: Financial reporting quality has been under scrutiny especially after the collapse of major com-
panies. The main objective of  this study is to investigate the audit committee’s effectiveness on the finan-
cial reporting quality among the Malaysian GLCs following the transformation program. In particular,
the study examined the impact of audit committee characteristics (independence, size, frequency of meet-
ing and financial expertise) on earnings management in periods prior to and following the transformation
program (2003-2009). As of 31 December 2010, there were 33 public-listed companies categorized as
Government-Linked Companies (GLC Transformation Policy, 2010) and there were 20 firms that have
complete data that resulted in the total number of  firm-year observations to 120 for six years (years
2003-2009).  Results show that the magnitude of earnings management as proxy of financial reporting
quality is influenced by the audit committee independence. Agency theory was applied to explain audit
committee, as a monitoring mechanism as well as reducing agency costs via gaining competitive advan-
tage in knowledge, skills, and expertise towards financial reporting quality. The study is important as it
provides additional knowledge about the impact of audit committees effectiveness on reducing the
earnings management, and assist practitioners, policymakers and regulators such as Malaysian Institute of
Accountants, Securities Commission and government to determine ways to enhance audit committees
effectiveness and improve the financial reporting of GLCs, as well as improving the quality of the
accounting profession.
Abstrak: Kualitas pelaporan keuangan telah di bawah pengawasan, terutama setelah runtuhnya perusahaan-
perusahaan besar. Tujuan utama dari penelitian ini adalah untuk mengetahui efektivitas komite audit pada
kualitas pelaporan keuangan antara GLCs Malaysia yang mengikuti program transformasi. Secara khusus,
studi ini meneliti dampak dari karakteristik komite audit (kebebasan, ukuran, frekuensi pertemuan dan
keahlian keuangan) pada manajemen laba pada periode sebelum dan setelah program transformasi (2003-
2009). Pada tanggal 31 Desember 2010, ada 33 perusahaan publik yang terdaftar berkategori sebagai link
Pemerintah-Perusahaan-perusahaan (GLC Transformation Policy 2010) dan ada 20 perusahaan berdata lengkap
sehingga jumlah perusahaan di tahun pengamatan mencapai 120 perusahaan selama enam tahun (tahun
2003-2009). Dari hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa besarnya manajemen laba sebagai proksi dari kualitas
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pelaporan keuangan dipengaruhi oleh independensi komite audit. Teori keagenan diaplikasikan untuk
menjelaskan komite audit, sebagai mekanisme pemantauan serta mengurangi biaya agensi melalui keunggulan
kompetitif dalam pengetahuan, keterampilan, dan keahlian terhadap kualitas pelaporan keuangan yang
diperolehnya. Penelitian ini penting karena memberikan pengetahuan tambahan tentang dampak efektivitas
komite audit dalam mengurangi manajemen laba, dan membantu praktisi, pembuat kebijakan dan regu-
lator seperti Institut Akuntan Malaysia, Komisi Efek dan pemerintah untuk menentukan cara untuk
meningkatkan efektivitas komite audit dan meningkatkan pelaporan keuangan GLCs, serta meningkatkan
kualitas profesi akuntansi.
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*Note: 1. GLCs Transformation Program is to transform the Government to be more effective in its delivery of
services and accountable for outcomes that matter most to the public and second, to move Malaysia forward
to become an advanced, united, and just society with high standards of living for all.
2. Khazanah Nasional Berhad (KNB) is the investment holding arm of the Government of Malaysia. It
manages the assets held by the Government and undertakes new investments.
3. Employee Provided Fund (EPF) is mandated to provide retirement benefits to its members through the
efficient and reliable management of their savings.
Introduction
Audit committee effectiveness has be-
come prevalent in the uprising corporate gov-
ernance agenda around the globe, and also in
emerging economies. Malaysia is no excep-
tional. Malaysian Code of Corporate Gover-
nance (MCCG) and Bursa Listing Require-
ment were introduced as the best practices
to improve the corporate governance among
Malaysian listed companies. Furthermore, the
progress of corporate governance in Malay-
sia was strengthened when the government
introduced the Green Book through their
GLC’s transformation program* in the year
2004. The comprehensive guidelines in the
‘Green Book on Enhancing Board Effective-
ness’ was distributed to all GLCs by 31st
December 2005 and they were required to
follow these guidelines by 1st January 2007
(GLC Transformation Manual 2005). The
Green Book’s objective is to provide manual
guidelines to raise the overall effectiveness
of  the boards that are consistent with MCCG,
Bursa’s Listing Requirements and other leg-
islations.
Prior literatures such as DeZoort et al.
(2002), Klein (2002), Felo et al. (2003), Xie
et al. (2003) and Abbott et al. (2004), dem-
onstrate that effective audit committees en-
sure better monitoring of the management in
ensuring a good financial reporting quality.
Additionally, until now various studies have
been conducted regarding the relationship
between audit committee effectiveness and
financial reporting quality of publicly listed
companies, but few focusing on the GLCs.
GLCs are known as key drivers of the Ma-
laysian economy and come with their own
characteristics. To date, four percent or 20
GLCs in Bursa Malaysia’s GLCs are able to
generate RM 235.5 billion (49 percent) of
total market capitalization of the Malaysian
economy, and directly contribute about ten
per cent to the Malaysia Gross Domestic
Product. These figures proved that the GLCs
as a group are one of the contributors towards
the growth of  country.
Thus, it is very important for GLCs to
maintain their effectiveness to sustain their
contribution to the Malaysian economic
growth. In addition, in Malaysia there is a lim-
ited number of evidence in measuring the
effectiveness of audit committees through the
financial reporting quality among GLCs com-
panies. Hence motivates the current study and
significantly assists the government in evalu-
ating improvement of  the existing policy. This
is important to safeguard investors and pub-
lic interest as principal stakeholders against
the misbehavior of managers, and thus in-
creases investor and public confidence in the
Malaysian GLCs. Therefore, in light of  this
situation, the current study seeks to investi-
gate the ability of the audit committee to
enhance board effectiveness on the financial
reporting quality which subsequently provides
recent evidence on Malaysian GLCs.
Jamil & Nelson
290
In particular, the study examines the
impact of audit committee characteristics (in-
dependence, size, frequency of meeting and
financial expertise) on earnings management
in a period prior to and following the GLCs
Transformation Program (2003-2009). GLC
Transformation is the program that improves
performance of  Government-linked compa-
nies. The government’s efforts at improving
performance in companies under its control
or stewardship will have a positive demon-
strative effect on the rest of the corporate
sector. Undertaking such a program should
result in a sustainable lift to the current tra-
jectory of  GLC performance, improving
Malaysia’s ability to achieve its mission in
economic growth. In the current study, the
transformation program is expected to have
improved the audit committee’s effectiveness
where the audit committee is one of the com-
ponents to improve the GLCs’ performances.
Based on the aforementioned research objec-
tive, the following research question (RQ) is
yet to be answered:
RQ: What is the impact of  audit committee’s effec-
tiveness on the financial reporting quality among
Malaysian GLCs subsequent to the Transfor-
mation program?
This paper is organized as follows, the
second section will give a brief literature re-
view that will then be followed by theoreti-
cal framework, hypotheses and methodology.
The next section will be the analysis of re-
sults and discussion. The last section will pro-
vide the conclusion with brief explanation on
the limitations and suggestions for future re-
search.
Literature Review
GLCs are peculiar economic entities as
they may have public policy objectives even
though they operate as corporate organiza-
tions (Mazzolini 1979; Powell 1987). They
engage in a vast range of activities in diverse
fields and can be fully owned or partially
owned by the Government. According to
Putrajaya Committee GLC (PCG) high per-
formance, (2007) GLCs are defined as com-
panies that have a primary commercial ob-
jective and in which the Malaysian Govern-
ment has a direct controlling stake through
Khazanah, Ministry of Finance (MOF),
Kumpulan Wang Amanah Pencen (KWAP),
and Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM). The GLCs
are also controlled by other federal govern-
ment linked agencies such as Permodalan
Nasional Berhad (PNB), Employees Provi-
dent Fund (EPF) and Tabung Haji. Apart
from a percentage of  ownership, controlling
stake also refers to the government’s ability
to appoint board members, senior manage-
ment and make major decisions (e.g. award
contracts, strategy, restructuring and financ-
ing, acquisitions and divestments etc.) for
GLCs either directly or through Government
Link Investment Companies (Hamid 2011).
GLCs were established as a solution to
accelerate economic and social developments.
Governments created GLCs in order to con-
trol certain key sectors considered vital for
the development of the national economy
(Razak et al. 2011). GLCs are controlled by
the Malaysian government via the Federal
Government-Linked Investment Companies
(GLICs). GLICs are investment arms of  the
government that allocate government funds
to the GLCs and they are vital in the Malay-
sian economy. To complement the MCCG
2000, the Putrajaya Committee on Govern-
ment Link Companies (GLC) High Perfor-
mance (PCG) introduced a framework to
guide GLC transformation and upgrade the
effectiveness of GLC Boards with the intro-
duction of the ‘Green Book’. The study is
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motivated from the empirical result by Hamid
(2011) who concluded that GLCs are rela-
tively more transparent in corporate gover-
nance practices and this adds to their higher
valuations. Thus, the effectiveness of  the
audit committee is the main subject in the
current study to examine whether the best
practice adopted will bring in value to GLCs
through its financial reporting quality.
For GLCs in Malaysia, the measure of
adequacy of these mechanisms is how effec-
tive the guidelines provided in the Green
Book are on enhancing audit committee’s ef-
fectiveness with the quality of financial re-
porting. To improve the financial reporting
quality of  the GLCs, transformation program
they are equipped with the Green Book
manual to provide guidelines in enhancing
board effectiveness. The guidelines are sig-
nificant as the benchmark because the study
will provides recent evidence on the audit
committee’s effectiveness after the transfor-
mation program as recommended by the
PCG’s guideline. Thus, it will further contrib-
ute to the debate on the firm’s control mecha-
nism. The current study seeks specifically on
the audit committee’s effectiveness because
audit committees play a role not only as moni-
toring devices but other responsibilities are
also included such as appointing external au-
ditors and determination of  audit fees, review
of the quarterly and year-end financial state-
ments of  the board and reviewing the firm’s
internal control (MCCG 2007). The study
investigates whether the independence of au-
dit committees, the size of audit committees,
the frequency of meetings and financial ex-
pertise of the audit committees in GLC com-
panies affect the quality of financial report-
ing. The findings will be significant because
they will enable government authorities to
assess the effectiveness of  the transforma-
tion program and thus take appropriate ac-
tions. The study extends the literature by us-
ing pre and post transformation programs so
as to study the impact of the effectiveness
of  the audit committees on the GLC’s finan-
cial reporting quality following the GLCs
transformation program.
Theoretical Framework and
Hyphotheses Development
In the current study, agency theory (AT)
is found to be relevant to the study, because
it explains the audit committee, which func-
tions as a monitoring mechanism to reduce
agency costs (Menon and Williams 1994).
According to agency theory, separation be-
tween the owner and manager, which results
in the separation between ownership and con-
trol, subsequently leads to agency costs. In
order to mitigate the agency costs, contracts
are written between the parties that Jensen
and Meckling (1976) named the agency rela-
tionship. In relation to the existing study, the
board of directors represents the agent, and
the shareholders are the principals. Whilst, the
audit committee, as part of the board of di-
rectors, is viewed as a monitoring device and
used to prevent opportunistic behavior and
strengthen the quality of financial reporting,
so as to mitigate agency conflicts between
preparers of financial statements and outside
shareholders (Piot 2004).
In this study, the audit committees are
expected to play a significant role as the moni-
toring device and intended to strengthen cor-
porate governance functions which indirectly
will likely improve the financial reporting
quality (Sivaramakrishnan and Yu 2008). To
improve the financial reporting quality of
GLCs, the transformation program is
equipped with the Green Book manual to
provide guidelines in enhancing board effec-
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tiveness. A specific part of  the Green Book
contains audit committee charters for the
GLCs to adhere to and functions as the recom-
mendations made for improving audit commit-
tee effectiveness. Four of  their recommenda-
tions are; (i) a majority of audit committees
should be independent directors, (ii) audit
committees should comprise of at least three
members, (iii) at least one of the Directors
must be a Malaysian Institute of Accountants
(MIA) member or have three years working
experience and (iv) audit committees should
meet at least once a year. With these require-
ments, they are able to understand and inter-
pret financial statements to effectively fulfill
their role in monitoring the company’s sys-
tem of internal control and financial report-
ing. Thus, the hypotheses will be developed
based on the audit committee characteristics,
which include its independence, size, fre-
quency of meeting and financial expertise.
Audit Committee Independence
The role of an audit committee is to
safeguard an organization through its author-
ity to question top management regarding the
way financial reporting responsibilities are
handled, as well as to make sure that correc-
tive actions are taken. Thus, for GLCs in Ma-
laysia, the Green Book stipulates that all
GLCs companies must have audit commit-
tees comprising of three members of whose
majority shall be independent. The commit-
tee oversees the reporting process as well as
the internal control mechanism within an or-
ganization.
As in the case of the board of direc-
tors, the monitoring function on behalf of
shareholders is enhanced as the indepen-
dence of  the committee increases. Prior re-
search suggests that financial statement
frauds are more likely to occur in firms with
less audit committee independence (Bronson
et al. 2009). Audit committee independence
helps to ensure quality audits and contributes
to financial statement user reliance on the fi-
nancial reporting process. In relation to the
role of audit committees on the quality of
financial reporting, Beasley et al. (1999) finds
that independent audit committees signifi-
cantly reduce the likelihood of financial mis-
statement. Thus, this relationship suggests
independent audit committee members are
effective to control earnings management
practices. Hence, the first hypothesis is:
H
1
: Firms with a higher number of independent
audit committee members are negatively related
to the magnitude of  earnings management.
Audit Committee Size
As mentioned earlier, the Green Book
recommended in the audit charter section that
GLC companies need to appoint the audit
committee amongst its directors that are to
be composed of not fewer than three mem-
bers. A larger audit committee may result in
potential problems in the financial reporting
process being uncovered and resolved. This
might be due to the fact that as the size of an
AC increases there will be more resources
available within the committee, hence im-
proving the quality of oversight. Dalton  et
al. (1999) found a positive relation between
size and the monitoring function of the board
that results in higher performance docu-
mented in prior studies.
The MCCG is consistent with the List-
ing Requirement of Bursa Malaysia that au-
dit committees shall comprise of at least three
directors. However, there is a question of
whether larger audit committee size would
lead to more effective monitoring. It is ex-
pected that the larger committee size in-
creases the resources available to the audit
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committee and improves the quality of over-
sight, which meant reducing the level of earn-
ings management. It is assumed that with
more members, more diverse skills and knowl-
edge are employed by the committee to en-
hance monitoring, hence improving the qual-
ity of  the financial reporting. Thus, the hy-
pothesis is conjectured as follows:
H
2
: Firms with a higher number of audit committee
members are negatively related to the magnitude
of  earnings management.
Audit Committee Meeting
The audit committee, which intends to
play a major role in oversight, would need to
maintain a high level of  activity. The audit
committee requires meetings at least once a
year as recommended by the Green Book.
The audit committee should meet regularly,
with due notice of issues to be discussed and
should record its conclusions in discharging
its duties and responsibilities. The frequency
of audit meetings is assumed to increase the
effectiveness of monitoring (Collier and Gre-
gory 1999). In addition, Zhang et al. (2007)
argue that the effectiveness of audit commit-
tees might increase the numbers of meeting
when there are significant problems in con-
trol, consistent with Abbott et al. (2002).
Therefore, it is expected that the more often
an audit committee meets; the more active it
is being perceived and leads to fewer finan-
cial reporting problems (Menon and William
1994). Hence, the third hypothesis is:
H
3
: Firms with higher frequency of audit committee
meetings are negatively related to the magnitude
of  earnings management.
Audit Committee Expertise
Audit committees are responsible for
numerous duties that require a high degree
of accounting sophistication such as, under-
standing auditing issues and risks as well as
the audit procedures proposed to address
them and evaluating judgmental accounting
areas. Thus, consistent with the recommen-
dations in the Green Book, audit committees
in GLCs must have least one Director who is
a Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA)
member or have three years working experi-
ence. To be effective in performing their role
in oversight of the financial reporting qual-
ity, the audit committee should be composed
of people with some financial expertise
(Bedard et al. 2004).
The audit committees need to evaluate
financial reporting quality as part of its over-
sight responsibilities. Therefore the members
are required to be financially literate and at
least one of them should be a financial ex-
pert, as there is a need to assess and evaluate
financial reporting. As noted by Baxter and
Cotter (2009), firms with higher earnings
quality have a greater proportion of qualified
accountants on audit committee. Further, as
documented by Nelson (2011), audit com-
mittee experts contribute to the financial re-
porting quality; when it was shown that ac-
counting affiliates audit committees have
negative and significant relationship with dis-
cretionary accruals. Hence the fourth hypoth-
esis is conjecture as follows:
H
4
: Firms with higher proportion of audit commit-
tee with financial expertise are negatively re-
lated to the magnitude of  earnings management.
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Research Design
Sample
This study utilized secondary data as the
main source of  information. The information
relating to the audit committee independence,
size, frequency of  meeting, expertise, firm
size, leverage and return on asset (ROA) are
collected from company annual reports. As
of 31 December 2010, there were 33 public
listed companies categorized as Government
Linked Companies (GLC Transformation
Policy 2010). These GLCs were classified into
six major industries including trading and ser-
vices, plantation, finance, construction, con-
sumer product, industrial product, infrastruc-
ture project companies (IPC), and technolo-
gies.
The availability of data for these 33
GLCs was examined to ensure the abnormal
accrual in each industry from year 2003 to
2009. In addition, these accounting data is
important to ensure each sector-year con-
tained more than 10 observations. The data
covered from the period of pre until the pe-
riod of  post transformation as to fulfill the
discretionary accrual estimation requirements
and to see the impact of  transformation on
the magnitude of management earning activi-
ties. For analysis comparison of  the transfor-
mation program, the study denotes the pe-
riod of  2003 to 2005, as the pre-transforma-
tion program, and 2007 to 2009, as the post
transformation program. It is also acknowl-
edged that the effect of  the transformation
program could be seen for a few years after
the issuance of  the circular. Year 2006 is
eliminated to account for the transformation
transition period.
The final sample is 20 companies from
33 GLCs, as shown in Table 1. The total firm-
year observations become 120 for six years
(years 2003-2009). The companies selected
are from four major sectors which are com-
prised of 12 companies from trading and ser-
vices sector, three companies from consumer
product, three from industrial product and one
each from the plantation and construction
sector respectively. The GLCs from IPC and
technologies sectors are excluded in the final
sample due to less than 10 observations from
each sector-year and non-availability of data.
GLCs in the finance sector are not selected
because of  their financial statement’s com-
ponents that are difference from non-finance
sectors.
Table 1. Sample Selection
Companies
Listed GLC as at 31 December 2009 (total population) 33
(less) incomplete data 6
(less) companies from finance industry 4
(less) companies from IPC 3
Total Sample 20
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Data was collected from Datastream
database and hand-collected from the annual
report of each GLC company for six years
from year 2003 to year 2009. Annual reports
are downloaded from Bursa Malaysia’s
website and the company’s main portal. Con-
tent analysis technique was used to extract
the data from the corporate governance state-
ment and some data is in the financial state-
ment. The time period of six years was se-
lected in this study because this study’s aim
is to examine the impact of audit commit-
tees effectiveness on the financial reporting
quality in Malaysian GLCs following the
transformation program.
Research Method
The study adopts a two-step research
process. First step is in measuring the discre-
tionary accruals, which is the proxy of  earn-
ings management. Second step is pooled re-
gression analysis to test the association be-
tween the dependent variable (DACC) and
the independent variables of audit commit-
tee characteristics (AC independent, AC size,
AC frequency of  meeting and AC expertise).
 Measuring Discretionary Accruals
(DACC) as proxy of  Financial Reporting
Quality. Financial reporting quality is repre-
sented by the magnitude of earnings manage-
ment. The discretionary accrual (DACC) is
becoming a proxy of earnings management.
Klein (2002b), Yang and Krishnan (2005) and
Rahman and Ali (2006) had implemented the
level of  accruals as a proxy for their financial
reporting quality. To measure discretionary
accruals, this study applies the Dechow and
Dichev (2002) accrual quality model, which
has recently been considered as a better proxy
for earnings quality (Jaggi  et al. 2007). The
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model is mea-
sured by estimating the following regression
(all variables are scaled by average assets):
TCAjt=0j + 1jCFOjt-1 +
2jCFOjt + 3jCFOjt + 1 +
vt.............(1)
CAjt= Firm j’s total current accru-
als in year t,(CAjt - CLjt
- Cashjt + STDEBTjt)
CAjt= Firm j’s change in current
assets between year t-1 and
year t;
CLjt= Firm j’s change in current
liabilities between year t-1
and year t;
Cashjt= Firm j’s change in cash be-
tween year t-1 and year t;
STDEBTjt= Firm j’s change in debt in
current liabilities between
year t-1 and year t;
Assetsjt= Firm j’s average total assets
in year t and t-1; and
CFOjt= Firm j’s net cash flow from
operation in year t.
Pooled Regression Analysis. The
study attempts to investigate the impact of
audit committees effectiveness on the finan-
cial reporting quality in Malaysian GLCs fol-
lowing the transformation program. An au-
dit committee’s effectiveness is modeled as
independent variables and other control vari-
ables consistent with prior studies. The defi-
nition and measurement of variables is in
Table 2. The discretionary accruals (DACC)
model is as follows:
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DACC= 
1
ACCINDEP

+


2
ACCSIZE

+


3
ACCMEET

+
 

4
ACCEXPERT
 
+

5
SIZE + 
6 
LEVERAGE+ 
7
ROA+ ...........................................(2)
Table 2.  Definition of  Variables
Variables Operational Measures
Dependent Variable
Discretionary accruals (DACC) Total accrual minus non discretionary accrual.
Independent Variables
Audit committee independent (ACINDEP) The proportion of audit committee being in-
dependent
Audit Committee Size (ACSIZE) Total number of  audit committee members
Audit Committee Meetings (ACMEET) The number of audit committee meeting held
during the financial year
Audit Committee Expert (ACEXPERT) The proportion of audit committee members
possess professional accounting qualifications
(ACCA etc) or member of  any professional ac-
counting bodies (MIA,CPA etc) to total num-
ber of audit committee members
Control Variables
Firm size (SIZE) Firm size in natural log.
Leverage (LEV) The ratio of  total liabilities to total assets.
Return on Asset (ROA) The ratio of  net income to total assets.
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Analysis of Design and
Discussions
Descriptive Analysis
Table 3 presents the descriptive statis-
tics of  all variables investigated in this study.
The table shows the mean, standard devia-
tion, minimum and maximum values of the
dependent and independent variables. Using
data from 120 observations of  annual reports
for the periods of  pre and post transforma-
tion programs (2003-2009), it is found that
the average of earnings management for the
sample is 0.003. It is consistent with previ-
ous studies that show a positive mean such
as Dechow et al. (1995) that reports a mean
of 0.002. On the other hand, the current
study shows an interesting result when the
current discretionary accruals are lowered; as
compared to other Malaysian studies by
Rahman and Ali (2006) that reports a mean
of 0.0132, Atef (2009) at 0.1652, and Nelson
(2011) of  0.0604. Subsequently, suggesting
more effectiveness of the guidelines on fi-
nancial reporting quality of GLCs, and bet-
ter quality of financial reporting as compared
to other Malaysia companies.
Correlation Analysis
Table 4 shows that absolute DACC are
significantly negatively correlated with firm
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics (N=120)
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
ABSOLUTE DACC 0.000 0.455 0.003 0.001
ACINDEP 0.20 1.00 0.701 0.750
ACSIZE 3 9 4.34 0.983
ACMTG 3 21 5.98 2.724
ACEXPERT 0.125 1.00 0.297 0.139
SIZE (LOG 10) 8 10.6 9.379 0.570
LEVERAGE 0.0004 0.910 0.401 0.235
ROA -0.412 0.659 0.065 0.137
Note: DACC= Total accrual minus non discretionary accruals;
ACINDEP= The proportion of audit committee being independence.
ACSIZE= Number of AC member;
ACMEET= The number of audit committee meetings held during the financial year;
ACEXPERT= The proportion of audit committee members possess professional accounting qualifications
(ACCA etc) or member of  any professional accounting bodies (MIA,CPA etc) to total number
of audit committee members;
SIZE= Firm size in natural log;
LEV= The ratio of total liabilities to total assets and
ROA= The ratio of net income
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size and ROA. Other independent variables
and control variables are not correlated with
the absolute DACC. The highest correlation
is between ACINDEP and ACSIZE, 0.335,
which suggests that multicollinearity is not a
serious problem since none of the variables
were found to exceed 0.9 (Tabachnick and
Fidell 2007), while, absolute DACC are posi-
tively correlated with audit committee inde-
pendence, size, expertise, frequency of meet-
ing and leverage. Many prior studies in earn-
ings management literature document a nega-
tive association of  firm’s size with earnings
management such as Gul et al. (2002), Klein
(2002b), Krishnan (2003) and Balsam et al.
(2003).
Pooled Regression Analysis
Table 5 summarizes the regression
analysis results for the pooled data of trans-
formation program (2003-2009) .The F-value
for the pooled data for pre and post transfor-
mation programs is statistically significant at
the 1 percent level where the p-value is 0.069.
The R² is 12.3 percent and the adjusted R²
for the pooled data is 6.9 percent. The ad-
justed R² is consistent with  Hashim and
Susela (2008b) who examined the relation-
ship board independence, CEO duality and
accrual management with adjusted R², 9.1
percent. One possible reason for low adjusted
R² for pooled periods is the small number of
GLCs companies that were available before
and after transformation program. This is
consistent with prior studies by Yen  et al.
(2007) utilizing only 25 samples of  GLCs.,
Razak et al. (2008) at 27 GLCs over the pe-
riod 1995 to 2005 to examine the impact of
GLCs ownership structure and corporate per-
formance, and recently, Najid and Rahman
(2011) at 47 GLCs for a period from 2001 to
2006.
Hypothesis 1 (H
1
) proposed that the au-
dit committees with more independent mem-
bers are negatively related with the magni-
tude of earnings management. The result of
the study from the pooled data found a nega-
tive and significant relationship between
DACC and AC independence. The result is
consistent with Klein (2002) that shows there
is a negative relationship between indepen-
dent audit committees and earnings manage-
ment. This relationship suggests independent
audit committee members are effective in
controlling earnings management practices.
Thus, H
1
 is supported.
Audit committee size (ACSIZE) shows
a positive non-significant relationship hence;
H2 that expect a negative relationship with
the magnitude of earnings management is not
supported. The result contradicts with prior
studies such as Yang and Krishnan (2005),
and Lin et al. (2006) where audit committee
size had a negative association with earnings
management. For ACMEET and ACEXPERT,
the results show a positive direction and are
not significant. Similar to previous Malaysian
studies such as Rahman and Ali (2006) and
Ismail  et al. (2008), there is no evidence to
indicate that audit committee meetings and
expertise significantly impact financial report-
ing quality. Besides, the findings of  this study
are not consistent with prior studies such as
Xie  et al. (2003), Bedard  et al. (2004) and
Park and Shin (2004), which found that lower
earnings management is associated with the
presence of a financial expert in the audit
committee. In a nutshell, H
3
 and H
4
 are not
supported.
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Table 5. Pooled Regression Analysis
DACC=
 

1
ACCINDEP
 
+
 

2
ACCSIZE
 
+
 

3
ACCMEET
 
+
 

4
ACCEXPERT
 
+
 

5
SIZE
 
+
 

6 
LEVERAGE
 
+
 

7
ROA
 
+
 

Coefficients Standard Significant p-value
Error (t-stat)
(constant) 0.170 0.095 1.681 0.096
ACINDEP -0.007 0.041 -0.172 0.003 **
ACSIZE 0.001 0.016 0.186 0.153
ACMTG 0.100 0.012 -0.040 0.268
ACEXPERT 0.008 0.039 0.204 0.238
FIRMSIZE -0.018 0.010 -1.932 0.056
LEVERAGE 0.021 0.025 0.854 0.395
ROA -0.036 0.041 -0.889 0.376
DUMMY YEAR 2003 0.027 0.019 1.416 0.160
DUMMY YEAR 2004 -0.008 0.019 -0.424 0.673
DUMMY YEAR 2005 -0.010 0.018 -0.538 0.591
DUMMY YEAR 2007 0.017 0.018 0.933 0.353
DUMMY YEAR 2008 0.046 0.018 2.540 0.013
N 120
R² 0.123
Adjusted R² 0.069
F-value 1.737
P-value 0.069
*,**significant at 5% level (2-tailed and 1% level (2-tailed).
Note: DACC= Total accrual minus non discretionary accruals;
ACINDEP= The proportion of audit committee being independent.
ACSIZE= Number of AC member;
ACMEET= The number of audit committee meetings held during the financial year;
ACEXPERT= The proportion of audit committee members possessing professional accounting qualifica-
tions (ACCA etc) or member of  any professional accounting bodies (MIA, CPA etc) to total
number of audit committee members;
SIZE= Firm size in natural log;
LEV= The ratio of total liabilities to total assets; and
ROA= The ratio of net income to total assets.
Independent
Variables
Control
Variables
301
Gadjah Mada International Journal of  Business - September -December, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2011
Conclusion
This study examines the impact of au-
dit committee’s effectiveness on the finan-
cial reporting quality in Malaysian GLCs fol-
lowing to the transformation program. The
study was motivated by the emphasis given
by the Malaysian government. The effort by
the government has contributed to good cor-
porate governance practices on the financial
reporting quality of Malaysian GLCs through
the GLCs’ transformation program. Financial
reporting quality is being proxied by earnings
management. Earnings management can be
measured by persistence, predictability,
smoothness, discretionary accruals and ac-
crual quality model. To measure earnings
management, this study employed the accrual
quality model developed in Dechow and
Dichev (2002) as a better proxy for earnings
quality (Francis  et al. 2004; Doyle  et al.
2007; Jaggi et al. 2007). To see the impact of
the audit committee effectiveness such as AC
independence, AC size, AC financial exper-
tise, AC frequency of  meeting and discretion-
ary accruals as the proxy of  earnings man-
agement, a total of 120 non-financial GLC
companies listed on Bursa Malaysia’s Main
Board, over the period of 2003-2009, with
complete data for discretionary accruals and
audit committee characteristics as the mea-
sure of board effectiveness were selected.
On the other hand, the study was not
able to find any association with the magni-
tude of earnings management on the audit
committee size, audit committee expertise,
frequency of meeting, FIRMSIZE, LEVER-
AGE and ROA except for audit committee
independence. Hypothesis 1 (H
1
) proposed
that the audit committees with independent
members are negatively related with the mag-
nitude of earnings management. The result
of the study from the regression analysis
found a negative and significant relationship
between DACC and AC independence. The
main evidence shows that the presence of
independent audit committees possibly re-
duces earnings management practices thus
leading to higher financial reporting quality.
This finding is consistent with suggestions
from prior studies (Abbott and Parker 2000,
and Carcello and Neal 2000) indicating inde-
pendent audit committees enhance corporate
governance.
Audit committee size (ACSIZE) and
frequency of  meeting (ACMEET) show posi-
tive direction for the study. It contradicts with
the hypothesis (H
2
) and (H
3
) where a nega-
tive relationship is expected with the magni-
tude of earnings management. Thus, the re-
sult contradicts with prior studies such as
Yang and Krishnan (2005), and Lin et al.
(2006) where audit committee size has a nega-
tive association with earnings management.
The findings are consistent with Rahman and
Ali (2006) and Ismail  et al. (2008); there is
no evidence to indicate that audit committee
frequency of meeting and expertise signifi-
cantly impact financial reporting quality. Fur-
thermore, the findings of  this study are not
consistent with prior studies such as Xie et
al. (2003), Bedard et al. (2004) and Park and
Shin (2004) that found lower earnings man-
agement are associated with the presence of
a financial expert among the members of the
audit committee. Xie et al. (2003) argue that
boards that meet more often could reduce
earnings management activity as they are able
to allocate more time for issues such as earn-
ings management, while boards that seldom
meet are unlikely to focus on these issues.
In addition, AC financial expertise
(ACEXPERT) is found to be non- significant
because the study focuses on AC members
who are qualified accountants. For example,
in a Korean study, Choi  et al. (2007) the fo-
Jamil & Nelson
302
cus is on the different professional back-
grounds of directors to investigate the effects
of  a director’s quality on firm performance.
They examine different professional back-
grounds of outside directors such as lawyers,
accountants, bankers, politicians, govern-
ment officials, and academicians as well as
executives of affiliated and non-affiliated
firms. Their results show a positive contribu-
tion of  executives of  non-affiliated firms and
academicians to firm performance. Perhaps,
investigation on the different professional
backgrounds of  AC members will provide an
interesting avenue for future research.
In a nutshell, it appears that only audit
committee independence influences the au-
dit committee’s effectiveness on the quality
of reporting in GLCs following the transfor-
mation program. This study provides inves-
tors, regulators, and other financial informa-
tion users with an understanding of the role
audit committee independence have on the
occurrence of earnings management activi-
ties in GLCs. The results found in this study
may serve as an input for the regulator to
encourage a 100 percent audit committee in-
dependence from the management. Besides,
there are problems that can be addressed such
as, based on several initiatives in improving
corporate governance in Malaysian GLCs like
MCCG 2000 (revised 2007) and transforma-
tion program, Malaysian GLCs generally have
lower performance as compared to their ri-
val private sector firms. Although an impor-
tant aim of  the transformation is to make
GLCs top performing companies, this requires
them to adopt a profit orientated corporate
culture rather than retaining their bureau-
cratic practices. In addition, some GLCs are
unable to meet their profit targets because
of their parallel needs to address social con-
cerns. This could also be attributable to the
weak management structures and possibly
undue political interference in the decision-
making processes. All in all, these problems
possibly need to be concerned in ensuring the
corporate governance initiatives for GLCs in
Malaysia can achieved their objectives.
There are some limitations that can be
highlighted in this study. First, this study is
limited to 120 Malaysian GLCs from various
sectors listed in Bursa Malaysia due to the
availability of data. The number of GLCs
companies in Malaysia is relatively low; hence
leaves no choice to utilize the whole popula-
tion. Secondly, this study cannot be general-
ized to other countries (particularly developed
countries) with different regulated market and
high investor protection, less family owner-
ship, high reliance on public debt, less con-
centrated and no pyramidal ownerships, be-
cause GLCs in Malaysia maybe have been
defined differently from other companies in
other parts of the world. In addition, this is-
sue is prevalent in developing countries where
financial statement users are less likely to be
able to see through the manipulated earnings,
partly due to the financial statements, which
are less transparent, and less sophisticated
users.
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